WORLD LAW
CONTINUITY IN THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
HUGO J. HAHN*
"[C]ontinuity ... is in itself an element of legal justice."**
PART ONE:t
CONTINUITY IN THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

international organization1 is a collective entity established
by treaty or other international act and pursuing common interests of
its member states. Its organs have such functions, powers and duties
as the law of the organization may provide. To the extent that these
functions are to meet lasting needs of the member states, their continuity must be ensured beyond changes in the objectives, jurisdiction,
institutional structure or even extinction of the organization originally
entrusted with those tasks. Various legal techniques have been used
to obtain that continuity. Where the existence of the organization and
its basic purposes remain unaffected, amendments to its constituent
documents and adaptation of its institutional structure would appear
to be sufficient. However, when an organization is extinguished, the
proper method for securing continuity2 in the exercise of functions
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which member states desire to see maintained is the devolution of those
functions on another organization by means of succession.
The continued exercise of these functions by a successor institution
may be provided for in treaties or other definitive arrangements of an
equivalent character.3 There is, however, authority 4 to support the
view that even in absence of such definitive instruments the requirement of continuity in international life demands the transfer of functions from the moribund organization to another organization "in all
cases where this is consistent with or indicated by the reasonably
assumed intention of the parties as interpreted in the light of the purpose of the organisations in question."'
It may seem strange that the problem of devolution arises at all
with regard to corporate entities, since the concept of corporation or
body politic was originally and still is conceived to preserve certain
rights in perpetual succession, which rights, if conferred on natural
persons, would fail in process of time. 6 Nevertheless, "succession"
having been used for centuries to denote the substitution of one sovereign state for another and the legal consequences of such transfer,' it
is not surprising that the term has also gained currency in the law of
(1954), the leading monograph on its subject matter, speaks quite appropriately of the
inseparability of corporate identity and functional continuity as regards states. Id. at 6.
As will be shown, the two concepts are not necessarily linked in the law of international
organizations.
8 The nature of such arrangements is herein discussed.
'International Status of South-West Africa, [195o] I.C.J. Rep. 128, 132-42 (advisory opinion). See also the practice of other United Nations organs in 4 REPERTORY
OF PRACTIcE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS
13-38 of comment on U.N. CHARTER
art. So (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1955. V.2. (Vol. IV)); id. at Supp. No. x 'If 21-62 of
comment on U.N. CHARTER art. 8o (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957. V. 4 (Supp. x Vol. II).
i OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (Sth ed. Lauterpacht ed. 1955); LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT

279-8o (i958). Another proponent of this view is Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: International Organization and
Tribunals, 29 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. x, 8-so (1952) (thesis based on the 195o advisory
opinion quoted in note 4 supra). In his eloquent separate opinion in the case of Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South-West Africa (1956]
I.C.J. Rep. 23, 48, 59, Judge Lauterpacht calls the devolution of the League of Nations'
supervisory functions in respect of South-West Africa on the United Nations "the most
important example of succession in international organization" and considers this transfer as a result of the doctrine that treaties and other international instruments must be
interpreted with a view "to secure their effective opration."
'See notably FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEcUM ANGLAE 31-33 (Chrimes ed. 1942);
see also 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES 267 (x 4 th ed. 1896); 4 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 207
(1959).
SSCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW x63-64 ( 3 d ed. 1957), gives a plausible
historical explanation for the analogy drawn from the law relating to individuals.
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international organizations which here, as in other fields, has drawn
from the terminology acknowledged in the relations among states
In
following this custom, however, it should be kept in mind that "succession," not only as understood in private law, but also as originally used
in the law of nations, refers to factual situations which are generally
hardly comparable to those with which the law of international organizations must cope.' If, therefore, specific principles developed in connection with state succession are susceptible of application to the law of
international organization at all, they can be applied only by way of
analogy.10
The means for preserving continuity of international executive or
rule-making functions1 1 rarely have been chosen as a consequence of
legal considerations.1
Rather, the choice arrived at is usually contingent on elements which one might call, in a now fashionable term,
"metajuridical," if the cases at hand made it uncertain that the decision
on how to ensure continuity was almost always political in nature.
Political decisions on questions of international law being founded
by definition 8 on the discretionary assessment of international relations at a given moment, not on any preconceived opinion of law, and
the interests of most great powers being apparently directed at underscoring those features which justify the qualification of an event as
sui generis in order to avoid a precedent possibly restricting liberty of
choice in the future, 4 the legal dassification of the methods used thus
far in the practice of international organizations for ensuring the con, This is amply illustrated by the language of the International Court of Justice in
its three Advisory Opinions on South-West Africa, [I955] I.C.J. Rep. 67; [1954] I.C.J.
Rep. 113i [x95o] I.C.J. Rep. t28, and by such authors as FITZMAURICE, Op. cit. supra
note s, at 9; SCHNEIDER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 86-94 (1959); SINGH, TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIsATIONs 113 (1958).
9 The abundant literature on state succession tends to prove this assertion, notably
monographs dealing with specific aspects of the devolution of territorial sovereignty,
such as MOSLER, WIRTSCHAFTSKONZESSIONEN

BE
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(1949).

" Scheuner, Vom Bonnet Grundgesetz Zur Gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, FESTscHaIFT
NAWIASHY 9, 46-48 (.956).

z' On these notions compare Hahn, Internationaland Supranational Public Authorities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP.PROB. 639 (196t).
op.

" On a corresponding phenomenon in the relations among states compare MAREK,
cit. supra note 2, pts. II-IX, 191-545.
is On the criteria applied in the making of political decisions see CHARLES DE VIS-

SCHER, THEORIES Er R-ALITES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 95-99, 317-23

ed. 196o),,and the authors listed therein.
1
,International law is a "limitation of national power."
AMoNG NATIONS 249 (2d ed. 1954).
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tinuity of their functions can hardly be attempted on the basis of the
motivations set forth by states in explanation of one approach or another.
Yet, inasmuch as such pronouncements are evidence of the intention
of the parties in a specific instance, they cannot be left aside in the
interpretation of the international arrangement to which they relate,
if interpretation is required.
A more appropriate dassification of the means for ensuring continuity of functions in the law of international organization might
result from a comparison of the factual situations in which they were
used. By grouping the actual cases with a view to the comparability
of the political, economic, or sociological background from which they
arose, one could probably arrive at a truthful picture of the diversity
of legal effects ensuing from the same or substantially similar factual
developments. However, assuming the veracity of the events related,
the common denominator of the different phenomena thus brought
under one heading would not be a legal element, but instead the
resemblance of pre-legal data to each other. That approach, then,
would suffice for demonstrating the varied behavioral consequences
resulting from a specific type of factual setting, rather than for showing
the legal typology of the processes used to ensure continuity of internationalized functions.
The proper way of presenting this typology is probably the grouping of the cases in the light of their normative features, i.e., their
classification according to the legal means employed to secure continuity. A survey of practice reveals four major headings under which
the methods used to obtain continuity may be conveniently set out:
(I) treaties, or international acts equivalent to treaties, provide for
the succession (conventional succession) which may take place
as between:
(A) a moribund organization and an entity created for the purpose of continuing some or all of that organization's functions together with such new tasks as may be incumbent on
it by virtue of its proper law (substitution);
(B) a moribund organization and an already existing institution
which, in addition to its own activities, is to continue those
of the moribund organization in whole or in part (merger);1
or
"Merger is distinguished here, as in corporation law, from consolidation, which
means the uniting of two hitherto independent corporate entities in the form of one new
institution. No instance of such a consolidation is known to the author.
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(C) two organizations equally continuing to exist after some functions of one have been transferred to, or have in fact begun
to be exercised by, the other (transfer);
(II) conventional international law' 6 does not provide for such succession or does so only in respect of certain functions or assets of
an organization, while the exigencies of a specific situation call
for continuity of the other functions as well, and force appropriate legal means for ensuring continuity on the parties concerned (automatic succession);
(III) political and factual situations identical with or substantially similar to those which in categories (I) and (II) gave rise to succession are dealt with by amendments to the constituent texts of
an organization or to the relevant legislative acts of its organs
(constitutional adaptation);
(IV) the practice of an organization adapts its functions to changing
conditions and thus, by a suitable interpretation of the existing
law of the organization, makes conventional and automatic succession, as well as the use of the amendment process, unnecessary
(administrative adaptation).
The same set of problems or any of them may arise with regard to
international organs, i.e., intergovernmental institutions without autonomous organization and proper legal personality, or with regard to
instrumentalities of international public organizations.
I.
CONVENTIONAL SUCCESSION

The law of international organizations has not yet brought about
rules which would govern the devolution of functions from one organization to another in the absence of a treaty or equivalent international
act. Usually, the silence or the lack of texts either prevents succession
or leads to solutions which are punctual in nature, devoid of any link to
precedents and measured to meet no more than the political, economic,
" L.e., treaties and international acts equivalent to treaties.

" The transition from preparatory or provisional organizations to permanent institutions, whatever its legal nature may be, is primarily not the result of an attempt
to ensure continuity, but rather of attempts to sidestep constitutional limitations in the
basic texts of those institutions themselves which did not permit bringing the definitive
organizations into being at once, but only on deposit of a certain number of instruments
of ratification or acceptance. On such transitions from provisional to definitive organizations, which will not be discussed here, see SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 87.89.
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or legal exigencies of the moment. Rules of customary international
law or even recognized usages have not yet been developed which,
in the absence of international acts of a legislative character, would permit to subsume a given set of facts to pre-existing norms about succession or devolution as between international organizations. Therefore,
international legislation 18 in its manifold forms unavoidably dominates
legal technique.19 Conceived to meet concrete issues, the solutions
which international legislation has provided may suffice to discover
some underlying precepts of general application. Thus far, past instances of conventional succession seem to have been left in a farreaching doctrinal isolation. Not even a statistical survey of cases is
available which could serve as a first stepping stone for the development
of a doctrine of succession in this field.
There is hardly any doubt that "international law prescribes no
form for international engagements." 2 But while there is no distinction between formal and informal agreements, international engagements should continue to be distinguished according to the source of
their binding effect, i.e., as to whether their obligatory force flows from
a consensual arrangement among international persons, states or other
entities with international personality, or from a basic covenant among
the members of an international institution which provides for the
validity of such subsequent acts of that institution and its organs as
may be adopted in conformity with that covenant.
This distinction is based on elements of substance rather than of
procedure. Quasi-conventional acts of an international institution are
distinct from ordinary treaties also in that they presuppose, procedurally,
a permanent organizational framework within which they are adopted,
while that requirement is not essential to the negotiation of bilateral or
18 On the meaning of this term, see

i HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION § 3,

[hereinafter cited as HUDSON], where international legislation is deXIV-XV )x93)
fined as "the introduction of law governing the relations of states." This definition
should now be widened to comprise the introduction of law governing the relations of
states and the structure and functions of international institutions without any restriction as to the formal basis for the validity of an enactment.
19 See 2 DAHM, V6LKERRECHT II1 (196i). The various forms of international
legislation include treaties, quasi-conventional acts of international conferences, organs
and organizations, and decisions, recommendations and resolutions of international institutions. As to the latter, see Freymond, ixiANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
64 (1954) , Virally, La .aleur juridique des recommendations des organhationt internationaleS, z ANNUAIRE FILANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 66 (x956).

THE LAW OF TREATIES i5 (id ed. x961). See also, x ROSSEAU, PRIN2
"McNmAit
ciPES GWNiRAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 143 (€944); BRBER, LEHRBRIUCH DES
V6LKERRECHTS 413 (196o).
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multilateral treaties. Yet the more decisive difference between the two
kinds of international instruments upon which succession in the field
here at issue may repose, resides in the principles governing the application and interpretation of either of them. True, the dictum of the
Permanent Court of International Justice that "restrictions on the
independence of States cannot... be presumed ' 21 continues to impose
itself in international relationships devoid of an organizational character, and, more generally, the precept of restrictive interpretation 2 persists in exercising a profound influence on the behavior of member
states even of the most advanced supranational institutions within the
setting of those entities. 23 But there is also hardly any doubt that the
"teleological approach"2 4 is firmly accepted as one of the main methods
for judicial interpretation of the charters of international organizations
and acts adopted in conformity therewith in cases concerned with the
organic jurisdiction of these entities, in particular their institutional
structure and procedure as well as their rights and duties as employers
of international officials, but also with their treaty-making power.2 5
Consequently, it is not surprising if the same line of reasoning is
followed by the rule-making and executive organs of international institutions in their day-to-day practice under those texts.26 As will be seen,
"

Case of the S.S. "Lotus;'

P.C..J., ser. A, No. ao, at 18

Courts advisory opinion on Article 3, Paragraph

(1927).

See also the

the Treaty of Lausanne (frontier
between Turkey and Iraq), P.C.IJ., ser. B, No. 12, at 25 (1925): "[I]n choosing between several admissible interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of obligations for the Parties should be adopted."
" Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the
Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. YD. INT'L L. 48, 72 (1949).
s Examples are to be found in almost all reports of the High Authority and the
Commissions. Cf., e.g., SEME RAPPORT GtNiFLAL DE LA HAUTE AUTORITP SUR L'AC.
TIVIT

2, of

DE LA COMMUNAUTP EUROPPENNE DU CHARBON ET D'AcIER, 83 (5960): "IL]a

Communaut6 se trouve . . . en face d'une gamme 6tendue de mesures nationales, qui,
en g~n~ral, r~pondent plus i une situation nationale sp6cifique qu'i des n~cessit~s communes."
" Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice 195 z-4:
Treaty Interpretationand Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. YB. INTVL L. 203, 207 (1957).
,' In this respect, and perhaps in this respect only, it may no longer be an overstatement to conclude with the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community as follows:
"De l'avis de la Cour, il est permis, sans se livrer une interpretation extensive, d'appliquer une rigle d'interprtation g6nralement admise taut en droit international qu'en
droit national el selon laquelle les normes 6tablies par un trait6 on par une loi impliquent les normes sans lesquelles les premiires n'aurient pas de sens ou ne permettraient
pas une application raisonnable et utile." Pidiration Charbonni~re de Belgique v.
Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 8/ss, July 16, 1956, 2 REC. 133, 305 (1955-56).
" Cf. discussion in this article and Seyersted, Can the United Nations Establish Military Forces and Perform Other Acts without Specific Basis in the Charter?, 12 6sTE.
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 6FFENT,

RECHT i88, 2ox (1962).
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the impact of this mode of interpretation becomes less apparent in the
application of international instruments governing conventional succession than in the conclusions derived from those instruments in order to
justify an automatic devolution of functions in related cases. 27 But it
should be stressed in advance that substitution as a form of conventional
succession has been brought about, practically without exception, by the
interplay of treaties and norms of an organizational character-charter
provisions and acts of derivative international legislation, such as decisions, recommendations, and resolutions of international institutions.
A. Substitution

The instances presented under this heading have in common that
from their inception the successor organizations were meant to carry
on the functions of the moribund entities which became extinct as soon
as the devolution of their tasks had been accomplished.
(i) First considered is that form of substitution envisaged in the constituent texts of the organization substituted for the moribund one or
the terms of reference of the successor institution or where the travaux
priparatoiresfor its establishment leave no doubt that the new entity is
to replace the outgoing organization.
(a) ICAO
This is probably a correct summary description of what happened
in the case of the substitution of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for certain earlier international bodies. Article 8o of
the ICAO Convention of December 7th, 1944,28 required member states

to denounce the I919 Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation 9 and the 1928 Convention on Commercial Aviation; 80 the
article specified that as between contracting parties to the ICAO Convention the latter superseded the two previous treaties.
The i919 Convention had provided s for the establishment of an
International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN). 8 2 ICAN decided to dissolve and go into liquidation before the ICAO Convention
T

See on this intellectual process as a pattern of legal thought MORGENTHAU, LA
NORmES 89 (x934) (dealing more specifically with the justification of
customary law).
'sT.I.A.S. No. 1591; 2 PEASLEF, IN7ERNATIONALG vERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

RMALITL DES

51 (1956).

" 8 L.N.T.S. 23; 1 HUDSON 359.
3047

Stat. x9o

(93); T.S. No. 840; 4 HUDSON

"1
Chap. VIII, art. 34.
"ICAN started to operate on July
force. i HUDsON 360.

ii,z922,

2354.

the date on which the treaty came into
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1947,) S

came into effect on April 4,
i.e., during the lifetime of the
Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO), which
prepared the work of the ICAO after the i944. Chicago Conference.'As the i919 Convention was to be terminated and the technical
annexes to the four Chicago Conferences of 1944? 5 provided for the

exercise of all the activities pursued by ICAN thus far, PICAO and
ICAN had only to agree on the technical details of the transfer of
assets and functions. The plenary meeting of ICAN in London in
August, 1945, suggested a standard formula for denunciation of the
1919 Convention by contracting parties thereto."' Shortly thereafter, its
Secretary-General, Mr. Albert Roper, was appointed Secretary-General
of the PICAO on the understanding that he would retain his former post
until the winding up of ICAN's affairs.31 Then followed the transfer to
PICAO of studies on eighteen specified subjects undertaken by ICAN,
in respect of which the plenary meeting of ICAN expressed the expectation that PICAO would take suitable action on the basis of the preparatory work done by ICAN. 3 It also invited ICAN member states
to terminate the application in their territories of the technical annexes
to the i919 Convention and to replace them by the corresponding
enactments of the ICAO Council. 3 Finally, ICAN established a fivemember Liquidation Committee which in its turn adopted a plan of
liquidation.4 0 While the institution itself ceased to exist on December
See generally 9 HUDSON 168.
* For the text of the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation see 9
U

HUDSON

157.
"See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 2282, CONFERENCE SERIES 64, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, NOVEMBER I TO DECEMBER
7, 1944, FINAL ACT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 38 (-945).
"eRes. No. 1207, 28 BULLETIN OFFICIEL DE LA CINA 36.

"'Res. No. 1167, Interim Council of ICAO, August I5, t945.
"eRes. No. 12t7 & 18, 29 BULLETIN OFFICIEL DE LA CINA 43-44.
"Res. No. 1219 & 2o, 29 BULLETIN OFFICIEL DE LA CINA 44.
"Res. No. 1222, 29 BULLETIN OFFICIEI. DE LA CINA 45.
Resolution No. 1222 provided, inter alia, that:
(i) member states be invited to notify their acceptance of the plan within 75 days and
any state not having replied by that time should be deemed to have accepted the plan;
(ii) in the absence of opposition, the plan would become applicable on April 1, 1947,
or on the date of the coming into force of the ICAO Convention, whichever were the

later date.

The minutes of the twenty-ninth session of ICAN, in Dublin, October 28-30, 1946,
do not indicate whether Resolution 1222 was adopted unanimously or by a majority;
they simply record that the Resolution in completed form was finally adopted by the
Commission. Minutes No. 168, second sitting of October 30, 1946.
The Liquidation Plan adopted by the Liquidation Committee during its meetings of
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31, 1947.41 liquidation was not completed until December 31, I94802
Archives, certain assets and obligations were transferred to ICAO on the
understanding that the latter would credit the accounts of the contracting
parties to the I919 Convention with their respective shares in the
liquidation. ICAO also took over claims for arrearages in contributions to ICAN on the dosing of accounts 8 On April I, x949, the
Council of ICAO, which in November, x947, had already approved the
proposals of the ICAN liquidation committee, noted that the liquidation of ICAN had been completed.
Another international body, the functions of which were taken over
by the ICAO, was the International Technical Committee of Aerial
Legal Experts, better known as CITEJA (Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Ariens). It had been created pursuant to
a recommendation adopted at the First International Conference on
Private Air Law held at Paris in 1925 to develop a code of private
international air law through the preparation of draft international
conventions for final adoption at periodic international conferences on
that subject. 4 4 Resolution VII of the Final Act of the 1944 Chicago
Conference45 recommended that these sessions be resumed as soon as
January 7 and 8, 1947, states in its paragraph IS that the Committee would notify
member states of ICAN as to the date of closing of the liquidation, while paragraph 16
provides that the Committee would "represent ICAN in order to carry out its liquidation
and will have full powers to conclude all agreements, take all necessary steps and issue
all instructions it will deem necessary."
The final report on the liquidation of ICAN on December 17, 1947 (C-WP/233
Appendix A) records that none of the contracting states opposed the original plan of
liquidation which therefore became applicable, under Resolution No. isza,on April 4,
1947. Section E of the report, entitled 'Denunciation of the x919 Convention, "con.
tains the statement that the Committee has drawn he attention of states that have not yet
denounced the Convention to the fact "that ICAN, as constituted since its establishment,
has ceased to exist as of December 31, 1947." Annex I to the report lists the denunciations of the 1919 Convention as of December 19, 1948. Under the heading "States who
have not yet notified denunciation at December 17, 1948" appear Bulgaria, Estonia,
Japan, Lettonia and Uruguay. (C-WP/z 3 3 at 27).
"The
day on which ICAO Convention became effective, as contemplated by
ICAN Res. No. 1222, supra note 4o.
42ICAO Doc. C-WP/2 33 , para. 7, August 3, 1949 (termination of the ICAN
liquidation).
Id. at Appendix A.
"See Latchford, Co-ordination of CITEMd With the New International Civil Adiation Organization, x DaE-"r OF STATE BULL. 3o n.z (1945). See also MEMoR.NDUM ON ICAO (THE STORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION)
46-47 (195).
" U.S. DEeT OF STATE, Pui. No. 2282, supra note 35, at 38-39.
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possible and that the activities of CITEJA be co-ordinated with those
of PICAO and later on ICAO. Following a resolution of the Interim
Assembly of PICAO, adopted at its first session in June, 1946,46 the
Special Legal Committee of PICAO, on directions from the Interim
Council, took up contact with CITEJA, which, in resolutions47 adopted
at meetings in Cairo in November, 1946, and at its final session in
Montreal in May, 1947, recommended the continuation of its work by
the Legal Committee of ICAO and provided for its own liquidation,
including the transfer of CITEJA files and archives for use by the
48
successor body.
Meanwhile, PICAO and, shortly after it came into being, ICAO
provided for continuity in the work of CITEJA by assigning to the
Legal Committee of the ICAO the tasks of the defunct body, 49 in addition to new functions in the field of international air law. While the
terms of reference of the successor body were thus widened, jurisdictionally it was in a less independent position than CITEJA, as the latter was
an autonomous international organ set up by a number of states which
provided the necessary funds, while the Legal Committee of ICAO is
part of the institutional structure of that organization and thus, in law,
subject to the procedural and substantive decisions of constitutionally
superior instances, i.e., the ICAO Assembly and the ICAO Council.
The expectation that, as successor to CITEJA, the Legal Committee of
ICAO would in fact enjoy as much independence as the defunct body,
was therefore based on elements of fact rather than on legal considerations. The subsequent history of the new Committee confirms this
view.50 It was a peculiarity of the two successions assumed by ICAO
that there were no treaty arrangements between the two bodies providing for the take-over, which, rather, rested entirely on concurrent
acts of the two organizations, ICAN and CITEJA. Furthermore, there
are enough indications to suggest that unanimity principle was not entirely honored in the termination of the multilateral instruments here
at issue.
,6x PICAO JOURNAL 70 (June 1946).
x PIACO JOURNAL 23 (September 1946-May 1947).

"Text of the Legal Committee's constitution as adopted by the ICAO Assembly on
May 13, 1947, in ICAO, RESOLUTIONS AND REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY, IST
TO 9 TH SESSION 1947-1955 39 (x956) (Appendix A to Resolution Ax- 4 6).
"See Latchford, supra note 44, at 496-97.
SOCf. ICAO, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY, IST TO 9TH
SESSION 1947-1955, 40 (x956) (Procedure for Approval of Draft Conventions).
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(b)WHO
A distinctly different legal technique prevailed in the substitution
of the World Health Organization (WHO)5 1 for the Office International d'Hygiene Publique (OHIP) established by the Agreement of
December 9, i9o7," and entrusted with the administration and supervision of existing sanitary conventions.53 When signing the WHO
constitution on July 22, 1946, the governments represented at the
WHO founding conference established an Interim Commission and
instructed it in an instrument of the same day, inter alia,"4 to take all
necessary steps for the transfer of OHIP functions and duties to itself
and to initiate the action required for the transfer of OHIP assets and
liabilities to WHO upon termination of the 1907 OHIP Agreement.
The desirability of appointing available personnel from the OHIP staff
to the successor organization was acknowledged. Still, on July 22, 1946,
all signatories of the 1907 Agreement, except Germany, Japan and
Spain,5 5 agreed, in a protocol concerning the OHIP, 6 that as between
themselves OHIP's functions should be performed by WHO or its
Interim Commission 7 and that they should terminate or denounce the
1907 agreement according to a procedure specified in its particulars."
The actual substitution of WHO for OHIP and the liquidation of
the latter's assets was carried out first by the Interim Commission, then
by WHO itself from 1946 to 1951 in collaboration with the organs of
the OHIP.5 9 A legal highlight of this take-over was the blanket endorsement of the technical decisions adopted by the OHIP in the
exercise of its function to carry out certain international sanitary conven" Established by a Constitution of July 22, 1946, in force since April 7, 1948. a
PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note z8, at 788.
s:2
oo BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 466.
'Listed in 1946-47 YEARBOOK OF THE UNiTED NATIONS 803-04. [hereinafter cited
as U.N. YEARBOOK].

"Id.

z(e) at 8or.

"5In January, 1952, the Executive Board of WHO noted that the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Germany, of Japan and Spain had also denounced the 1907
Agreement. HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH
ASSEMBLY AND THE EXCUTIVE BOARD 249 (sth ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as WHO
HANDBOOK].

"1946-47 UN YEARBOOK 803.
87 Id., arts. 1, 2.
58 Id., arts. 3-5. The devolution.of functions of UNRRA and of the Health Organization of the League of Nations on WHO was brought about in the broader context of
the transition from the League of Nations to the United Nations. See text accompanying
footnote 73 infra.
39 1947-48 U.N. YEARBOOK 91; 1948-49 U.N. YEARBOOK 1033-1046; 195o U.N.
YEARBOOK 932; 1951 U.N. YEARBOOK 921.
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tions60

Another legal highlight consisted in the parallel resolutions of
the OHIP Permanent Committee and of the Third World Health
Assembly, both taken in May, i95o,61 providing for the transfer of functions and assets on liquidation, and for the continuation of specific OHIP
projects as well as the acknowledgment by the appropriate WHO organs
of the completion of the substitution. Also of significance were the denunciation of the 1907 agreement by all contracting parties thereto and
the espousal by WHO of claims for arrearages in contributions due in
respect of OHIP from 1953 on.

As a preliminary legal assessment of the transition from OHIP to
WHO, it may be observed that while the protocol concerning OHIP
of July 22, 1946, and the arrangement of the same day62 are, in their
wording, in line with the unanimity principle as applied to the revision
and termination of treaties, it is doubtful whether the effective carrying
out of the substitution of WHO for OHIP under those international
acts was also in accordance with that precept. Rather, it appears that
the take-over and the dissolution of the OHIP as an international
entity were completed before all contracting parties to the i907 agreement had renounced that treaty.6 a
(c) WMO
Proceeding chronologically within the domain of substitution, the
next case in point is the transition from the International Meteorological
Organization (IMO) to the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO). The distinctive feature of this case is the absence of any
extraneous normative element, that is, of any rule not adopted by a
body of one of the two organizations involved by way of intra-organizational law-making such as a treaty abrogating an earlier international
arrangement, inasmuch as the decision to transform IMO into WMO
was taken in 1939 and implemented by the IMO's twelfth Conference
of Directors in i94.7. The IMO/WMO transition has this element
in common with the two successions assumed by ICAO. Previously,
IMO had been, since 1878, an association of directors of independent
public meteorological services. The purpose of the reform was to make
" WHO HANDBOOK
ox Id., at z48-49.

247

(November, 1948 decision of the Executive Board).

U.N. YEARBOOK 8oz.
eWHO HANDBOOK 249 ; note 55 supra. On the unanimity rule in this context see
*1946.47

HOYT, THE UNANIMITY RULE IN THE REVISION OF TREATIEs "pasjim (1959) and a
DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 1i9-20

(196x).
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that body an inter-governmental organization whose members would
consist of states and territories having such services.64
The Convention of the WMO, 8 which was adopted at the 1947
Washington meeting of the IMO, provides inarticle 26(c) that the
WMO may take over from any other international organization or
agency "the purpose and activities of which lie within the purposes [of
the WMO] such functions, resources, and obligations as may be transferred [to it] by international agreement or by mutually acceptable
arrangements entered into between the competent authorities of the
respective organizations." The WMO Convention came into force
on March 21, 195o. The transformation was completed on April 4,
1951. 6 This transition was put into effect at the last Conference
of
Directors of IMO by the adoption of a resolution providing, in the
language of Article 26(c) of the WMO Convention, for the hand-over
of IMO functions and assets to WMO

7

and of a parallel resolution by

the First World Meteorological Congress."8
This "mutually acceptable arrangement" carried out the most complete substitution feasible, the totality of the functions and assets of
IMO being taken over by WMO. 9 Again, the successor institution
gave blanket endorsement to the technical resolutions of the outgoing
organization 70 the concurrent resolutions also enumerated IMO publications which would from then on be published, maintained up to date,
7
or completed by WMO

and finally specified the conditions of employ-

ment of IMO staff engaged by WMO and the compensation to the
IMO staff not engaged by WMO.72
The transition from IMO to WMO is devoid of spectacular legal
elements which would place it apart from the other instances of
substitution. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, as applied by
WMO, the concept of "mutually acceptable arrangements" in Article
26(c) of the WMO Constitution as a means for the carrying out of a
e41947-48 U.N. YEARBOOK 981.
e52 PFASLEE, Op. cit. Supra note 28, at StS (x956).
October 11, 1947.
"Id.,
at 822.
7

IMO Publication

The Convention was signed on

No. 8S, Extraordinary Conference of Directors, Paris, March i 17, x95x, Final Report, Res. 32, at 71-75 (Lausanne 1952).
"' WMO Publication No. /I, First Congress of the WMO, Paris,
March ig-April
28, ig5i, Final Report; Vol. i: Resolutions; Res. (i) at 1-3.
3
"Id., 7 4, at 2.
id., Res. 4 (i), at 3-4.
I'
'Id.,
1

Res. 5(1), at 4-5.

2Id., Res. 6(1), at S.
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transition includes concurrent resolutions of the responsible bodies of
the WMO and of the other international institutions involved in the
transaction. Thus, WMO followed the corresponding practice of
WHO under article seventy-two of its Constitution, which contains the
same term.
(2) Apart from these instances of substitution of one international
entity for another moribund one, there are at least two major transitions where the functional domain of a defunct organization was split
among two or more successor bodies.
(a) UNRRA
Essentially, the winding-up of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) consisted of the separation of the
bundle of responsibilities incumbent on it as an all-embracing operational
institution coping with post-war economic and refugee problems in their
entirety and the assignment of these respective functions to the appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations.7 3
The first of these hand-overs concerned the UNRRA Health
Services, 74 which to a considerable degree were taken over by WHO
through the intermediary of its Interim Commission." UNRRA, under
the International Sanitary Convention and the International Sanitary
Convention for Aerial Navigation of December i5,I944,76 as extended
by protocols of April 23, 1946, 77 prolonging the duration of those conventions, had carried out the functions of the OHIP which the latter
was unable to discharge due to the war. In August, 1946, the Council
of UNRRA authorized the Director-General to assign UNRRA functions under these conventions to the WHO Interim Commission." The
other health functions of UNRRA were transferred to WHO by an
agreement of December 9, I946.7' By a resolution adopted in July,
1948, the First World Health Assembly recognized the assumption
"' The UNRRA agreement was signed and went into force on November 9,

1943.

9 HUDSON 84.

" See UNRRA Council Res. 94, 3

WOODBRIDGE,

THE HISTORY OF THE UNRRA

157 (90so).
I 7946-1947 U.N. YFaxRooK 801-04.
7o9 HUDSON 736, 254.
79 HUDSON 7511 772.

is3 WOODBRIDGE op. Cit. supra note 74, at 157-58. This transfer was effected as
from December I, 1946, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of
UNRRA and the Executive Secretary of IC/WHO on October z2, 1946. 3 WOODBRIDGE, op. cit. supra, at 351-52.

" Id. at 352-54.
at 157-58.

The authorization is contained in UNRRA Council Res. 97. Id.
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of UNRRA obligations and assets by the WHO Interim Commission
under the 1946 agreement"0 which, apart from dealing with the handover functions and assets, concerned also the possible use of UNRRA
personnel by the successor body.
A second substitution concerning UNRRA was the hand-over of its
child welfare functions to the International Children's Emergency Fund
(ICEF), which had been founded by the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 57(I) of December 1 I,1946, pursuant to a proposal of the UNRRA Council.8 1 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution creating ICEF contemplated that it would use such staff,
records, and equipment as might be transferred from UNRRA during
the latter's existence. But the most important contribution of UNRRA
to ICEF consisted of sizeable allocations of money, which represented
the larger portion of UNRRA's residual resources. 2
A somewhat short-lived substitution was brought about with respect
to the social welfare activities of UNRRA. While the UNRRA Council 3 had apparently envisaged lasting continuity of its work in that field
by the United Nations and, in particular, the latter's Secretariat, the
United Nations General Assembly provided only for continuance during
194784
A third substitution was the transfer to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) of technical and advisory
services initiated by UNRRA to increase food production in devastated
areas and assignment of the money necessary to ensure initial continuity
in this work."5 An agreement to this effect was concluded between the
two organizations in February, 1947.88 This agreement also provided
for the assignment of UNRRA personnel to FAO for the purposes set
out in the arrangement.
Finally, UNRRA's work for displaced persons, which constituted a
major part of its activities, was handed over to the International Refugee
Organization (IRO) as were the functions of the pre-war organization
charged with this responsibility, the Intergovernmental Committee on
8

OWH0 HANDBoox zx.

*XRes. 103, 3 WOODBRIDGE, Op. cit. supra note 74, at t67-68.
82 See I WOODI.DGE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 306-07; preamble to UNRRA-UN

liquidation agreement of Sept. 24, 1948, 27 U.N.T.S. 350.
"

In

'U.N.

Res. 95, 3 WOODRDGE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 158-59.

Gen. Ass. Res. 58 (Dec. 14, 1946).

"1946-1947

U.N. YEARBOOK 691.

S 3 WOODEIDuiGE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 354.
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Refugees."7 Authorized by a resolution of the UNRRA Council, which
outlined the policy to be observed for the continuation of UNRRA's
operation, notably that repatriation to the country of origin should be
encouraged and that UNRRA personnel not observing that policy should
be dismissed, 88 the agreement of June 29, 1947, between the Preparatory Commission of IRO and UNRRA provided continuity of UNRRA

functions8 9 which, however, was soon drastically affected by the insufficiency of funds available for the tasks taken over by the new agency.

Subsequently, in July, 194.7, UNRRA relinquished further responsibility for the care of displaced persons.

The winding up of UNRRA's financial affairs followed.

This in-

volved the dosing of offices and operational agencies, release of the staff,
and transfer of the residual assets and activities to the United Nations. 90

That transfer was the subject of an agreement between UNRRA and
the United Nations in September, 1948,"' which provided for the
assumption by the United Nations of residual accounting functions following the termination of the liquidation, supervision of the completion
of the official UNRRA history, maintenance of UNRRA's archives,
and assignment of certain UNRRA claims 92 for the account of the
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.93 The
transition from the post-war period to peace, from a relief organization
to specialized peacetime agencies of the United Nations had been car-

ried out.
The medley of legal techniques employed in the winding-up of
On the history of this body, see Editor's Note at 8 HUDSON
"Res. 99, 3 WOODBRIDGF, op. cit. supra note 74, at 16 1-64.
"Id. at 356-58.
"Id. at 315-20.
2t7 U.N.T.S. 349.

19.

"See United Nations v. Brandes, x952 U.N. YEARBOOK 818, [1952] Iwr're. L. REP.
490 (No. iog), in which a Belgian court ruled that the United Nations was entitled to

UNRRA's claims under the terms of the assignment made by UNRRA to the United
Nations for the benefit of UNICEF. In Wencak v. United Nations, Annual Retort of
Ile Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization,U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. ixtth
Sess., Vol. 9, Supp. No. x, at 107 (A/ 3 13 7 ) (x956), the Supreme Court of New York
dismissed the claim of a former refugee by decision of January x8, 1956, who had

alleged injuries incurred while he was traveling on a UNRRA truck. According to the
New York court, the United Nations is in no way a successor to UNRRA, as the agreement of September 27, 1948, was not an assumption of liabilities upon succession to
assets.
"2The Agreement was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 241(111) on November iS, 1948. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 3 d Sess., Vol. 9,
at

1o5

(A/ioS) (x948).
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UNRRA's affairs offer nothing that could not already be detected in
the substitutions considered earlier.
(b) IRO
The dissolution of IRO and its replacement by two other international institutions, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration (ICEM), did not involve all the responsibilities with which
IRO had been entrusted. As it was intended to be a temporary organization, IRO early concluded agreements with states providing for the
turning over of specific IRO functions in order to secure continuity on
extinction of IRO. 4 The remaining tasks of IRO together with the
assets allocated thereto were distributed between the UNHCR and
ICEM. This was possible because the number of post-war refugees
had been drastically reduced during IRO's existence.
The UNHCR, created by a resolution of the United Nations Gen" For a list of these agreements and their texts, see

HoLBoRNE, THE INTERNATIONAL
The history of IRO offers another case of succession, as its Preparatory Commission concluded on June 27, 1947, an agreement with
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees providing for the transfer of certain
functions, inancial obligations, personnel, and archives to PCIRO. HOLIORNE, op. cit.
REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, 594 (1956).

supra at 591-92.

Though the Liquidator of the IRO in his REPORT at z6 denies that there was any
succession in respect of IRO's assets and maintains in consequence that a "complete"
liquidation took place in the winding-up of that organization, this broad statement may
be too sweeping because:
(i) it is not borne out by the Statute of UNHCR, and the other relevant Resolutions of
the General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council, as set out in UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
SIONER FOR

CONCERNING THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMIS-

REFUGEES (HRC/INF/48) (1961), which provide for the assumption of

a

considerable part of the defunct body's tasks by UNHCR;
(ii) specific clauses in management agreements concluded between the IRO and other
parties provided that IRO upon its closure will designate a successor organization to
undertake rights and obligations formerly exercised by IRO. In most of these agreements UNHCR was designated as successor organization and therefore became the legal
successor to IRO to the extent provided for in the agreement. E.g., arts. 11,4.; 111,33
IV(2) i of Management Agreement between IRO and Land Hessen concerning the
Philipps. hospital in Goddelau/Hessen together with the authorization of UNHCR succession to IRO responsibilities as required by the Agreement dated February 15, 1952
(Ref. DFO/TDS/es)s
(iii) during a series of conferences between the two organizations it was agreed that
certain specific IRO responsibilities would be taken over by UNHCR together with the
relevant documentation; and
(iv) Resolution io6 of the IRO General Council provided that the Office of UNCHR
should be consulted about the transfer of IRO responsibilities and assets to other organi-

zations.
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eral Assembly, 8 took over the legal and political protection of refugees,
together with the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations
concerned with the welfare of refugees and the money necessary for
their protection."' ICEM, 7 or more precisely the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
(PICMME), carried on IRO's resettlement activities and for that
purpose received from the moribund institution the charter zla of its
twelve-ship migration fleet, as well as nearly three million dollars
toward the completion of the final resettlement of a specified number
of refugees.

IRO terminated its activities on January ii,

1952, and

liquidation followed. s
(3) As can be seen from the above, substitutions are usually carried out
in accordance with certain principles which set the procedural and, to a
lesser extent, substantive patterns for all of them. None of them has
been provided for after the termination of the moribund organization.
Where substitution occurred, it was the result of an arrangement negotiated with the participation, or at least on the instructions, of organs
of both institutions concerned, the arrangement always being in the
nature of a consensual disposition over the functions or assets, or both,
of the outgoing entity.
The typology is less outspoken as regards the formal instrument
providing for substitution. As a rule, it is the treaty which prevails as
the main vehicle of transition. Yet, as has been seen, there have been
at least two instances, CITEJA/Legal Committee of ICAO and IMO/
WMO, where concurrent unilateral acts of the entities involved replaced the treaty, yet brought about the same effects as had interorganizational agreements in the other cases. One might therefore be
"Resolution 4 28(V) of December 14, i95o, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5 th Sess.,
Vol. 8, Supp. No. so, at 46 (A/x775) (950), 1950 U.N. YEARBOOK 585.
"HOLBoRNE, op. cit. supra note 94, at 56x-62.
'v Constitution of October ig, 1953.
See I PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 688.
The present writer has been advised, after the completion of this article, that
there was no transfer of the charters of the ships between the two organizations,
PICMME having concluded contracts directly with the shipowners for the ships used as
from the inception of PICMME's operations in February, 1952.
"'See x95i U.N. YEARBOOK 524; i95o U.N. YEARBooK 588; HOLBoRNE, op. cit.
supra note 94, at 565. Three agreements were made between IRO and PICMME

regarding the transfer of funds for the joint UNHCR/PICMME office in Hong Kong,
for the establishment of a trust fund to be administered by PICMME and for certain
movements of refugees to be undertaken by PICMME. The IRO Trust Fund Agreement
was concluded between the Liquidator of IRO and the Director of PICMME on July 2s,
1952, and amended on September 23, 1952 (Doc. PIC/LEG/A/ 4 /Rev.x).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

(Vol.
xg~z: 379
[

tempted to classify such concurrent resolutions as quasi-agreements.99
Still, it is submitted that this would perhaps not do justice to the spe-

cific nature of the law of international organization, which tends to
develop new forms in its own right and does not depend on analogies
drawn from the traditional law of nations or definitions consisting of
elements derived from that law for justification. 100
A second feature is the separation between the take-over of substan-

tive-administrative, operational, and regulatory-functions and the
winding up of the financial matters of the moribund entity. Not only
are the assets sometimes assigned to bodies other than the successor to
the functional responsibilities, but there is at least one case, that of
UNRRA/UN,' 0 ' where the assignment of assets was not accompanied
by an assumption of liabilities.102 Surely it is easier for an intergovernmental organization, whether moribund or successor, to ward off claims,
than it is for an ordinary subject of private or public law to do the same,
since the international corporate entity is usually clothed with a farreaching jurisdictional immunity in national courts.' 03 The reason why
assets and functions have been split in succession was, therefore, not that
claims against the successor should be excluded. Rather, the reason
for this way of dealing with cases of substitution may be explained by
the peculiarities of international organization.
While in the succession of states, practice has been guided by the
principle that the assumption of functions of the territorial sovereign
may carry with it certain-hardly overall-financial and other obligations of an economic nature,104 such a link between function and liability
" The expos6 by Freymond ix ANNUARIE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 64.
has shown that even each unilateral act of a deliberative organ of an international organization may be in the nature of a quasi-agreement. See Virally, supra note
(1954)
1o,

and 2 DAHM, V6LKERRECHT 25-35 (1961).
It should be noted, nevertheless, that the use of concurrent acts of law-making

10

bodies is not foreign to the law of nations, evidence being, e.g., United States-Canadian
co-operation in the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, which reposed largely on
concurrent actions by the legislatures of the two nations concerned. See BAXTER, DOcuMENTS ON THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY passim (196o); Cohen & Nadeau, The Legal
Framework of the St. Lawrence Seaway, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 29.
101 See UNRRA-United Nations Agreement of September 27, 1948, 27 U.N.T.S. 349.
102

See to this effect the ruling of the Supreme Court of New York in Wencak v.

United Nations, Annual Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. iith Sess., Vol. 9, Supp. No. I, at 107 (A/ 3 137)
(1956).

.oExceptions are, e.g., the International Finance Corporation and the International
Development Association.

For a review of this aspect of the immunities of international

organizations, see JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 37-45 (1961).
I DAHM,
10 See BERBER, LEHRBUCH DES VODLKERRECHTS 246 (196o);

V6LXER-
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does not necessarily exist in succession among international organizations. As the precedents show, it is conceivable that, for non-legal
reasons, a new organization assumes the functions without taking over
the assets or liabilities, or both, of its predecessor. The complete separability of the substantive and financial responsibilities of an organization in its dissolution thus seems another element which distinguishes
succession in the law of international organization from other instances
of succession in public international law. The absence of the territorial
element in the winding-up of the affairs of functional international
organizations, an element which in the succession of states by its sheer
existence has dictated certain solutions, appears to have permitted this
separability.
Finally, in the desire to execute efficiently the provisions of an
agreement or other international act relating to succession or devolution
as between international organizations, the constituent instruments of
the moribund institutions have not always been treated with the respect
that would have been due to them as treaties or treaty-like arrangements. As has been seen, there has been at least one case, that of
OHIP/WHO, where succession took place before the charter of the
extinct organization had been renounced by all the contracting parties
thereto. It is not contested that this was the expedient way of proceeding. Yet the fact remains that the exigencies of the law of treaties
were not complied with to the fullest extent, a phenomenon which appears again in the case of merger between international organizations.
B. Merger
The distinction between substitution and merger lies essentially in
the timing of the decision by the successor body to take over the moribund institution, either to carry on its work, to assume its financial liabilities, or both. While in the case of substitution the transition is part
of the terms of reference of the successor from the latter's inception, as
The rule set out, e.g., in § +i 9 of the German Civil Code (BGB)
oo (1958).
-the conveyance or take-over of someone's assets in their entirety entails ipso jure the
assumption, by the recipient, i.e., the beneficiary of the transfer, of all the debts and
obligations of the predecessor--seems to be limited in scope primarily to private law.
When the precept underlying the rule has been applied in international public law, this
was not the consequence of a private law analogy which hardened into a norm of customary international law, but usually the outcome of conventional or judicial measures
designed to settle concrete cases or controversies, though the relative frequency of such
solutions in international practice may betray the emergence of a more general principle.
Cf. Scheuner, supra note so, at 31 in respect of international public law and German
RECHT

constitutional law.
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set out in its constituent charter or other international acts or unmistakably resulting from the travaux prdparatoires,the question of merger
is decided at a later date. Thus, while in substitution, the structure and
functioning of the new organization is geared from the outset to replacing the outgoing entity, a merger involves subsequent adaptation.
Merger may involve more on the part of the successor organization
than the usual take-over procedure found when the technique of substitution is used. - The proper law of the successor, especially its constituent instrument, may require amendment to permit the modification
of purposes, structure, and functions which a specific merger calls for.
That amendment process may necessitate the passing of severe procedural hurdles unless the law of an international institution admits of
its carrying out in more simple forms. 105 In the instances to follow
here, no such difficulties had to be surmounted. The pattern observed
inpost-World War II substitutions was followed in almost every detail.
(i) IIA-FAO

By a resolution adopted at its first session in October, 1945, the
Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) recommended to its member states concerned the
dissolution of the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) by appropriate legal means. It further recommended that thereafter the assets
of IIA should be transferred to, and its functions under certain international conventions assumed by, FAQ. 0 8 In accordance with these
terms the Permanent Committee of the IIA,the executive body of that
organization, on March 30, 1946, suggested to the General Assembly of
the IIA the enactment of a resolution of dissolution10 7 which should also
request governments parties to the Convention of June 7, 1905, on the
Creation of IIA,'0 8 to terminate that convention in accordance with a
protocol.'0 9 In July, 1946, the protocol and the action taken by the
Permanent Committee of IIA regarding the transition to FAO were
approved by the General Assembly of IIA." 0 The protocol of March
See generally Schwelb, 31 BRIT. YB. IN'L. L. 49 (1954).
105 See Report of the First Session of the FAQ0 Conference, Quebec, Oct., 1945, at ss.
0

o Report of the Second Session of the F.4Q Conference, Copenhagen, Sept., t946,

'

Annex I at 62.
0oo
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 595 (19°5).
109 The text attached to the resolution read: "Protocol for the Dissolution of the
IIA and the Transference of its Functions and Assets to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 3oth March, 1946." IRISH TREATY SERIES, No. x3
(1948).

Actes de la x6ime Assemblie G~nrale, July 8-9, 1946, No. 3.
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30, 1946, to terminate the 19o5 convention provided that it should

come into, force upon acceptance by thirty-five members of the IIA,
though at the time there were more than fifty parties to the 19o5 convention and, other than the defeated states, at least Costa Rica, Mexico,
Ethiopia and New Zealand did not sign the protocol. While that instrument was to come into force as between the parties to it, it also provided
that the Institute should be brought to an end by the Permanent Committee after collection of all the assets of the Institute and their transfer
to FAO.
The two organizations agreed that the affairs of the IIA would not
be formally wound up and its assets and liabilities transferred to FAO
until the Permanent Committee had collected contributions from mem11
ber governments and satisfied financial obligations to the staff
The
protocol came into force on January 28, 1948, and on February 27, 1948,
the Permanent Committee of the IIA announced the dissolution of the
Institute." 2
Though the 1946 resolution of the IIA General Assembly113 had
instructed the Permanent Committee to perform the duties assigned to
it under the protocol, it nevertheless remains that the Committee's
ordinary authority under the 19o5 convention was limited to the collection of information and its normal business was conducted by majority
rule. Moreover, the 1946 protocol, in addition to providing for termination of the Institute, also stated that thereafter the powers, rights,
or duties attributed to the IIA by a series of international conventions
should devolve on FAO instead, though there was no provision for the
approval of such devolution by the parties to these conventions.
One might therefore be inclined to qualify the machinery for the
implementation of the IIA-FAO merger as an outright departure from
the unanimity principle in the revision of treaties. 1 4 However, the IIAFAO transition and the repeal of the 1905 convention has since been
accepted by IIA members who had not accepted the 1946 protocol, such
as the Federal Republic of Germany, as successor to the German Reich.
That feature, like some other instances in the history of the interorganizational relations,"15 might suggest that the revision and terminal Report of the Second Session of the F4O Conference, Copenhagen, Sept., 1946,
at 6o-62.
is DEP'T STATE BuLL. 828 (1948).
118
11

15

'

See Actes de la x6me Assemblie G~nrale, July 8-9, 1946, No. 3.

, HOYT, THE UNANIMITY RULE IN THE REVISION OF TREATIES 41-43 (1957).
Id.

at 25 1-52.
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tion of treaties may also be brought about by a majority decision, the
only states having a legal veto, in the absence of specific treaty provisions, being those whose territorial sovereignty will be affected by the
new arrangements. It is submitted that the following instance of
merger supports this view.
(2)

IIIC-UNESCO

The take-over of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had been foreshadowed during the
1945 conference which drew up the UNESCO constitution. However,
the reference made to the IIIC by L6on Blum on that occasion was so
vague that it left open the nature of the relationship to be established
between UNESCO and the Institute."" The merger was actually
initiated by the twenty-first and last Assembly of the League of Nations
which, on the proposal of its First Commission in April, 1946, adopted
a resolution transferring its property rights in the IIIC to the United
Nations.117 This transfer had been deemed necessary because, as a
consequence of the dissolution of the League of Nations, the IIIC had
lost its Board of Administration, which was composed of the members
of the Commission on Intellectual Co-operation of the League of
Nations."" At the suggestion of UNESCO,"' the Secretary General
of the United Nations proposed a draft resolution to the United
Nations General Assembly. The proposal, adopted in November,
...
"Nor

is it our intention to propose indirectly, however great the services it has

rendered, the maintenance of the former Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. That
Institute, with the working instruments it has available, which in our opinion it would
be unwise to ignore-is still at your disposal, but you will make exactly such use of it

as you may think fit."

Conference for the Establishment of UNESCO, Preparatory

Comm'n, 2d Plenary Meeting, London, June, 1945, at 7s (ECO/CONF./2 9 ). See
also the statement by the delegate of France, the IIIC's host state: "As regards the
organisation and personnel of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation,

such steps could be taken as might seem most suited to the purpose in view: the existing
elements might be retained or those same elements might be called upon to dissolve and
merge in U.N.E.S.C.O. like snow in a great river." Id. at 132-33 ( 4 th Comm'n Summary Reports, 3 d Meeting). On the general setting of the IIIC/UNESCO transition
see also UNESCO, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION PREPERATOIRE SUR LA CONFERENCE
GENERALE (doc. UNESCO. 7) (1946); LA FRANCE ET L'U.N.E.S.C.O. (1946).
.. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., zst Ass., Spec. Supp. No. x94 at 98 and oo
(A/ 3 3 ) (x946); Id. Annex 24 at zO, 255 (OFF.Doc,Annex E).

228 Id. at aSa.

...
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFp. REC. st SesS., ad pt.,

(1946).

5 th

Comm. 133 (A/77, corr. I & 2)
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1946,12° recommended the continuation of IIIC activities by UNESCO
on the coming into force of the latter's constitution, invited the Secretary
General of the United Nations to transfer IIIC property received by
him from the League of Nations, and urged the conclusion of an agreement between IIIC and UNESCO.
Applying Article XI(2) of the UNESCO Constitution of November I6, 1945,21 which permits mutually acceptable arrangements with
another specialized international organization whose functions lie within
UNESCO's field of activity for the transfer of resources and tasks to
UNESCO, the two organizations, IIIC and UNESCO, worked out an
agreement to that effect. After approval at the first session of the
UNESCO General Conference on December io, 1946,122 the agreement
was signed on December 19, 1946.'2' The arrangement envisaged the
continuation of the functions of IIC by the successor organization 2 '
and the transfer of IIIC assets to UNESCO, provided how these assets
should be used by UNESCO, and instructed the latter to give special
consideration to applications from former IIIC personnel "given equal
competence and merits of applicants.' 25 The agreement, in accordance
with its final clause, came into force on signature.126 Yet it was not
until August 24, 1956, that the liquidation of IIIC assets was finally
terminated and the remaining assets could be allocated in the UNESCO
12 7

budget.
'

The Preamble of the IIIC-UNESCO Agreement refers to October 25, 946, as

the date of adoption.
...
In force since November 4, 1946. 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 714.
""See Doc. UNESCO/C/ 3 o at 77 (1947).
" Agreement as printed in UNESCO Doc. No. Ext.Rel/7 of July 27, 1947.
124 UNESCO "shall endeavour to ensure the continuity of work done by the" IIIC.
(Art.2).
...Id. at Art. 4.
12The

1938 International Act concerning Intellectual Cooperation (8 HUDSON

2o8) gave the IIIC a broader basis. Until then it had been based on the

1924

Agree-

ment between the French Government and the League of Nations only. See Editor's
Note at 8 HUDSON 2o8-9. The 3938 act provided that if the number of contracting
parties should as a result of denunciations become less than eight, the act would no
longer remain in effect. Save evidence to the contrary, it seems that in fact the substance of that rule was respected in the course of the IIIC transition. It would be interesting to know whether the corresponding procedural proviso of the 5938 act
(Art.1o), which imposed two years' notice for denunciation and specified that such
notice had to be addressed to the French Government, was observed or by-passed. If
the answer is in the negative, as one would surmise, the tendency towards a restrictive
application of the unanimity rule would have found there another expression.
I.. Namely for the social sciences. cf. UNESCO Doe. 44 Ex/Decisions of August 21,
1956 at i9 (item io). The story of IIIC liquidation may be traced in detail on the
basis of the following UNESCO documents: 29 EX/ 38 of February 29, 1952; 29
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Few legal conclusions may be drawn from the two instances discussed under the present heading apart from the one already suggested,
namely, that in a merger the arrangements governing dissolution and
transition of the moribund institution tend to be applied and interpreted
in such a way as to achieve an efficient and timely continuation of the
tasks of the outgoing organization. Whether that approach is explained
in terms of a justified review of the unanimity rule in the revision and
termination of treaties, i.e., as an adjustment of a specific aspect of the
law of treaties to the exigencies of international organizations, or as an
outcome of pplitical developments forcing the hands of the states and
organizations concerned, 28 the result is always an acknowledgment of
the same phenomenon: the application and interpretation of organizational charters and norms enacted thereunder need no longer follow
the intention of the original signatories of such a covenant, nor need
be necessarily in line with the objective meaning of a rule, but must
above all, ensure, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary,
the efficient functioning of the international institutions concerned.129
The two instances examined tend to show that this principle prevails
also where the member states of an international organization, or even
their majority only, deem the continuity of the functions exercised by
that organization desirable, but have decided at the same time to see
that continuity ensured by another international agency.
The study of substitution and merger has shown that in practice the functional approach is usually applied. That is, the moribund
institution is done away with as expediently as is reconcilable with the
wishes of member states, in order that the tasks of the outgoing organization may be carried on without interruption. While during the lifetime of an organization the efficient exercise of its functions may require
EX/3 3 Add of March 13, x9525 29 EX/Decisions of April 23, 1952, at 17-8 (item
o) 5 30 EX/ 4 5 of June 3, 19525 30 EX/Decisions of July 4, x952, at 16; 37 EX/ 4 8
of March 1o, 19535 37 EX/Decisions of April 9, x954 at x6 (item 12.2) 1 42 EX/41
of October 20, 1955; 42 EX/Decisions of December 15, 1955, at 23 (item 13.1); cf.
also the Agreement between the League of Nations and the United Nations of July 19,
1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 1o9 and U.N. Doc. No. A/136 of November 7, 1946. For judicial
pronouncements on IIIC during the period of liquidation, see Weiss v. IIIC, [195i]
Int'l L. Rep. 458 (No.x44); Hickel v. IIIC, [1951] Int'l L. Rep. 460 (No.x 4 5);
Rothbarth v. IIIC, [i95x] Int'l L. Rep. 463 (No.1 4 6) i In re Weiss, [1953] Int'l L.
Rep. 531; Niestl6 v. IIIC, [x955] Int'l L. Rep. 762.
...As does CHARLES DE VISSCHER, O . cit. supra note 13, at 331-35.
2.See Sir Herch Lauterpacht's pronouncements in [1955] I.J.C. Rep. at 104-5;
[5956] I.J.C. Rep. at 44, 46. For a survey of pronouncements of the International
Court of Justice and its other judges along the same line see Fitzmaurice, 29 BRIT. YR.
INT'L L. 1 (1952) and 33 BRIT. YR. INT'L L. 203 (957).

Vol. 196-2: 379] INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

405

a -strengthening of its institutions, once transfer of those functions to
another international body is decided, the same underlying principle
may call for the rapid dissolution of the organization. The appropriate
display of internationalized functions, not the widening of the powers
of the international institutions which happen to be entrusted with
them, 30 is the aim of the teleological-functional approach.
C. Transfer
There is at least one instance where a conventional transfer of
functions took place between two international bodies, both of which
continue to exist, OHIP and UNRRA, by virtue of the International
Sanitary Convention and the International Sanitary Convention for
Aerial Navigation of December, I944.5l It is true that the tasks entrusted to UNRRA under these treaties 3 2 were to revert to OHIP once
the latter was no longer "unable ...

to carry out effectively all of the

duties and functions assigned to it" under various international sanitary
conventions,13 but that eventuality apparently never materialized because the OHIP was taken over by WHO before the hypothetical date
of the re-transfer arrived.

II.
AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION

Automatic succession can occur only where no rules of international
legislation are available to provide for or expressly justify the devolution of functions on a successor body or where they settle the succession
into some functions only and leave the legal fate of the others in
abeyance. Practice thus far reveals instances of the second category
only. The case in point is the assumption by the United Nations and
its organs of certain activities of the League of Nations. That transition is also interesting in those of its parts which constitute a conventional succession. 3 4 But for the purposes of legal typology, its more
10

This thesis has been developed by the present writer in more detail in io

BUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 1,

13-14, 36 (1961)

JAHi-

and in the penetrating study

by Seyersted, supra note 26, at x88, 201-14.
2219 HUDSON 236, 254.
"'As extended by protocols for their prolongation of April

23, 1946,

9 HUDSON

25!, 272.

'" Preambles of the 1944 Conventions, 9 HUDSON 236, z54.

184 The most exhaustive account of this aspect is Myers, Liquidation of League of
Nations Functions, 42 AM. J. INT'L L.

320

(1948).

A companion, but unpublished,

piece by the same author on "Liquidation of League of Nations Assets" was kindly made
available by Mr. Myers to the present writer. See also z WALTErs, A HisrORy OF THE
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important aspect is the non-conventional succession between the two
universal organizations which, according to some, 85 is a postulate or,
according to others, "constitutes the most important example of succes18 6
sion in international organization."
Where it occurred, conventional succession by the United Nations
was the fruit of the collaboration of its organs with those of the League
of Nations."3 7 At the outset, the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations envisaged the transfer of the
functions, activities, and assets of the League of Nations as they stood,
leaving the United Nations to continue, modify, or liquidate any part
in the light of its own policies and conditions."' However, even that
proposal was already heavily qualified in that no "political questions"
were to be included in the transfer and no recommendations were made
regarding refugees, mandates, or international bureaus. After the
coming into force of the United Nations Charter on October 24, 1945,
there followed the adoption of the "Common Plan" for the transfer of
League of Nations assets to the United Nations"3 9 by way of concurrent
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 4 ' and the Assembly of the League.""
811 (1952); WEISSBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 38-41 (z961) (the succession treaties) ; Wood, The Dissolution of the
League of Nations, 23 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 317 (1946). On the functional relationship
between the League of Nations and the United Nations generally see BARANDON, DIE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

VEREINTEN NATIONEN

UND DER VOLKERBUND

IN IHREM RECHTSGESCHICHTLICHEN

ZUSAMMENANG passim (1948).
a

DAHM, V6LKERRECHT 120 (1961)

Scheuner, supra note to, at 46-48.

See

also in a pronouncedly defensive manner, the written statement submitted by the Union
of South Africa as well as the oral statement submitted by its representative, Dr. Steyn
in International Status of South-West Africa-Pleadings Oral Arguments, and Documents 72, 273 (I.CJ. 1950).
[1956] I.CJ. Rep. 48 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, 3.).
: For a concise account see HOYT, op. cit. supra note 114, 72-75.
1*8

Report by the Executive Committee to the PreparatoryCommission of tho United

Nations to8 (1945).

239 1946-47 U.N. YzRnooK 111-xz.
2'0U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. (Ost Part of ist Sess., to Jan. to 14 Feb. 1946),

Resolutions Adopted by General Assembly, XIV Resolutions Adopted on the Report of
the League of Nations Comm., Sec. III of Res. 24(1)

of February 12,

1946, p. 36

(U.N. Doe. No. A/64).
Res. of April 18, 1946, L.N. Ass. OFF. REC. (zzst Ordinary Ses.)

2S.

The

Resolution specified that the League of Nations should cease to exist as from April 19,
1946, "except for the sole purpose of liquidation" of its affairs. At the same time, the
Council, Assembly, and the whole system of committees of the League were to disappear
and instead a Board of Liquidation appointed by the Assembly, to which the SecretaryGeneral was to be responsible, received full power to wind up the League in accordance
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In order to prevent a blanket transfer of League of Nations functions, as distinguished from League of Nations assets, the United
Nations General Assembly

42

reserved "the right to decide ...

not to

assume any particular function or power." The first function assumed
by the United Nations was the custody of the original texts of international agreements and of the registration of treaties.14 As to the
substantive functions of the League of Nations under treaties,144 the
General Assembly made a basic distinction between political and nonpolitical tasks. The latter were by and large, though not entirely, taken
over by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in pursuance of
a series of specific acts of the General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council, as well as in conformity with a variety of agreements
concluded for that purpose.1 45 The non-political tasks taken over included those relating to international control over narcotic drugs, traffic
in women and children, child welfare, health, refugees, and economic
reporting and communications.
One might consider the functions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) as non-political and their transfer to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as part of the operation which ensured
the continuity of certain League functions under the auspices of, or by,
the United Nations. 48 Yet, it should be noted that at the i945 San
Francisco Conference which drafted the Charter of the United Nations
and the ancillary instruments thereto, the decision in favor of the creation of a new court was taken largely in view of the absence of a number
of parties to the i92o PCIJ Statute and "the negotiations of the parties
not thus represented which would be required for effecting modifications in the i92o Statute would encounter difficulties and might be very
protracted."147 The transfer of functions exercised by the Permanent
Court of International Justice was thereupon provided for in Articles
thirty-six and thirty-seven of the ICJ Statute. Under Article 36(5) of
with the resolution and with the other decisions taken during the session. See also the
Agreements at i U.N.T.S. 1og, 119, 131, 153.
946),
12" U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. (ist Part of ist Sess., 1o Jan. to
4 Feb.

Resolutions Adopted by General Assembly, XIV Resolutions Adopted on the Report of
the League of Nations Comm., Sec. I, p. 35 (U.N. Doe. No. A/6 4 ).
'-3 Id. at 33-34-.
...These functions are listed in LEAGUE OF NATIONS Doc. No. C.3.M. 3 .1 9 4 4 .V.s.
Powers & Duties Attributed to the League of Nations by International Treaties and
commented upon by ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 32 (1957).
""s Myers, supra note 134, at 338.
...
This seems to be Professor Hoyt's view, Hov', op. cit. supra note 114, at 32.
147 14 U.N. CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 383 (x945).
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the ICJ Statute, declarations made under Article thirty-six of the PCIJ
Statute which are still in force are to be deemed acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period
for which they run and in accordance with their terms as between parties
to the ICJ Statute. Under Article thirty-seven of the ICJ Statute,
whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a
matter to a tribunal instituted by the League of Nations or to the Permanent Court of International Justice the matter is, as between parties to
the ICJ Statute, to be referred to the International Court of Justice.
All that remained to be done after the San Francisco Conference was
the de facto termination of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
This was brought about by collective resignation of its members14" on
January 31, 1946, the dissolution of the League of Nations having excluded their replacement.
While there has, therefore, been succession in regard to certain
activities and even a far-reaching "juridical-functional"' 49 continuity,
there can hardly be any question that no universal succession took place.
Insofar as no carry-over was conventionally agreed upon, either in treaties or equivalent international instruments, the postulate of an automatic
succession was the major, though not the only, legal basis for claims
alleging the right of the United Nations and its organs to exercise
powers conferred on the League of Nations.
The refusal of the Union of South Africa to propose a trusteeship
agreement for the Territory of South-West Africa' "0 ultimately resulted
in a series of political and judicial contests which centered around the
issue whether or not automatic succession as between two international
organizations may be sufficient as a title to rights and powers with which
a predecessor organization had been vested. After the Government of
the Union of South Africa had declined to continue the submission of
annual reports on the administration of the Territory of South-West
Africa, the United Nations General Assembly asked the International
"8 See Hudson, The Succession of the International Court of Justice to the Per=a.
nent Court of International Justice, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1957).
...ROSENNE, op. cit. supra note 144, at 31.
..O Which apparently was also contrary to

the intentions of the draftsmen of the
U.N. Charter as set out in the British Government commentary. Gt. Brit. Parliament,
House of Commons, 26 Session Papers, cmd. 6666, 6o, at 389 (Mis. No. 9) (1945-46).
For a history of the ensuing dispute see 4 REPERTORY oF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONs
ORGANS 595-98,
5-1a of comment on Article 8o (x9s5); REPERTORY OF PRACTICE
OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, Supplement No. 1, Vol. 2, 222-26, 17 5-20 of comment on
Article So (1958) ; and the pleadings, oral arguments and documents submitted to the
International Court of Justice in the first South-West Africa case.
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Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the international status of
that territory and some ancillary and related questions 5 ' which altogether aimed at elucidating whether the dissolution of the League of
Nations had put an end to the position of the territory as a mandate and
whether the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
would now apply.
The Court rejected South Africa's contention that the mandate had
lapsed when the League had ceased to exist.15 2 It held that South
Africa was obliged to submit to supervision by the General Assembly
and to render annual reports to it. It is true that the Court based this
view primarily on Article ten of the United Nations Charter, which
authorizes the General Assembly to discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the charter and to make recommendations on these
questions and matters to the members of the United Nations. This
competence, the Court felt, had in fact been exercised by a trio of resolutions since the end of the war.158 Yet around this ratio decidendi, the
Court grouped a number of dicta which in effect came dose to a recognition of an implied, or automatic, succession.
Starting from the premise that the "international rules regulating
the Mandate constituted an international status ' 154 recognized by all
members of the League of Nations, including the Union of South
Africa, and proceeding on the view that it could not be justified to retain the rights derived from the mandate and to deny obligations
thereunder 5 5 the Court confirmed that these obligations represented
the very essence of the trust which the Union of South Africa had
undertaken to safeguard and which had not depended on the existence
of the League of Nations."5 6 The Court saw this opinion confirmed by
one general and one specific element, namely Article 8o(i) of the
United Nations Charter on the one hand, which maintains the rights
of states and peoples and the terms of existing international instruments
until the territories in question are placed under the trusteeship system' 5 7 and, on the other hand, various declarations by duly authorized
11*

194.8-1949
1
U.N. YE.AoRBo 875.
"South-West Africa is still to be considered as a territory held under the Mandate

of December 17, 1920 .. . . " International Status of South-West Africa, [x95o] I.CJ.
Rep. x28, 138.
'"*U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 14i of Nov. x, 1947; U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 227 (III) of
Nov. 26, x9481 U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 337 (IV) of Dec. 6, x949.
""' International Status of South-West Africa, [z95o] I.CJ. Rep. tgS, 132.
158
Id. at 133.
U. at 34.
,J. at 133-34.
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spokesmen for the Union of South Africa which had recognized the
continuance of the obligations under the League of Nations Mandate.""8
It concluded therefrom that the Union of South Africa continued to
have the obligations set out in Article twenty-two of the League of
Nations Covenant. 159
The opinions of the two dissenting judges, Judge Read and Judge
Arnold McNair, are less significant for their deviation from the result
reached by the majority than for the arguments they furnished in
support of the opinion of the Court. Judge Read pointed out that
"parity of reasoning" 60 required the maintenance of the obligations as
well as of the rights of the Union of South Africa. Judge Arnold
McNair compared the mandate to a conveyance which created a "status
... in rem" distinguishable from personal rights less "resistant... to the
dislocating effects of international events" than real rights which had
acquired an objective existence.' 6'
It is true that Judge Arnold McNair emphatically denied the inference that there had been automatic succession162 and, in fact, the Court
also did nowhere state that it considered the status of South-West Africa
as a result of a non-conventional succession. 163 Yet, in the two advisory
opinions which in 195516 and 1956165 were devoted to the interpretation of the 1950 pronouncement of the Court, there occur passages 6
which come close to Judge Lauterpacht's view that the supervision
by the United Nations of the Mandate of South-West Africa constituted
an example of automatic succession in the law of international organizations.167 If, in spite of these dicta in support of the new pattern, no
unquestionable confirmation of automatic succession as among international institutions by the International Court of Justice is at hand, the
..
8 Id. at 134-36.
Id. at
Id. at
...
I at
'

60

2

143.

x66.

156-57.

.6.The term is his own.

Id. at i59.

...Compare, however, Judge Read's view that an international organization has, in
the absence of express provisions in its charter, "a legal power of liquidation . . . by
necessary implication.' Id. at 167.
", Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the
Territory of South-West Africa, [x955] I.C.J. Rep. 67.
165 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South-West Africa,

[z956] LC.J. Rep. 23.
'Id. at 27-30; Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions
Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, [x955] I.C.J. Rep. 67, 71-77.
""Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South-West Africa,
[1956] LCJ. Rep. 23, 48.
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predominant reason for such judicial restraint may be sought in the
circumstance that, basically, the novel postulate rests on the transplantation of a recognized institute of private law which, as yet, can be separated from its original factual and normative environment only with
great difficulty.
In private law, automatic succession is usually governed in all its
details by a set of pre-existing provisions of statutory law or, where such
statutory provisions are not available, rules of law developed by courts
on the basis of principles recognized since time immemorial. Not only
is this, or a similar normative setting, thus far foreign to the law of
international organizations generally, but the lack of such a legal order
has been for a long time considered both as a significant attribute of the
law of nations and as a merit in itself. The subjacent idea was always
that restrictions on the sovereignty of states cannot be presumed 0 8 but
must be expressly stipulated to be binding. Since automatic succession
as between international organizations of necessity burdens states beyond
the obligations imposed on them by express stipulations in treaties and
other international acts, inasmuch as they are at least held not to frustrate the exercise of functions by an international institution assumed on
the basis of automatic succession, that kind of succession as among international organizations runs counter to an accepted pattern.
Wide fields of international public law, notably in the domain of
interstate relationships, continue to be under the reign of that precept.
Yet, it is hardly questionable that in the law of international organizations the interpretation and application of rules of law come more and
more under the influence of a distinctly different legal doctrine, that
of the functional field. Where a norm cannot be rendered effective
except through the assumption by a new intergovernmental body of
specific functions-as distinguished from their entirety-exercised by a
defunct international instance and not handed over to a successor, the
new body may accordingly assume these functions notwithstanding the
silence of conventional international law. The Court avoids the word
"succession" for that process and thus takes into account the absence of
the normative machinery which makes automatic succession work in
private law. Instead it invokes the plea of necessity by explaining that
the only means to make the mandate system work consists in the
assumption of certain of the League's functions by the United Nations."8 9
sCase of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.1.J., ser. A, No. io, at xS (1927).
169

"The necessity for supervision continues to exist despite the disappearance of the

supervisory oigan under the Mandates System.

It cannot be admitted that the obliga-

"DUKE LdW JOURNA.L
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Indeed, that seems to be the proper approach in the case of a universal organization which lacks homogeneous composition and whose
members are therefore devoid of common views on the instrumentalities
and methods of inter-organizational succession when the constituent instrument is silent on the issue. The Court had to fall back on less
complicated notions than succession and to draw from the first principle of the law of international organizations, namely that they are
established to work, and to work effectively. It goes without saying
that this conclusion does not prejudice any solution which ultimately
may be arrived at in regard to automatic succession as between regional
organizations whose members have a common historical and legal
heritage. Though in such cases the method chosen will usually be one
which ensures continuity by providing that the old and the new instances are legally the same, it is conceivable that within the narrower
and closer communities of regional organizations, the concept of automatic succession will be applied. Until the present, however, the best
don to submit to supervision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has
ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international organ performing
similar, though not identical, supervisory functions." International Status of SouthWest Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. at 136.
As has been pointed out, e.g., by 3 DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 19-2O (1961) (and
authors cited therein); LAUTERPACH'-, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT xS8o-8z & 182-83 n.z8 (x958)
Scheuner, supra note so,

at 48 & nn.132-34, the result reached by the Court in the first South-West 4frica case
was also an afrmation of the precept that specific international situations may attain
the character of an objective status and remain unaffected by territorial or other changes
("The international rules regulating the Mandate constituted an international status
for the Territory recognized by all the Members of the League of Nations, including
the Union of South Africa." [x95o] I.C.J. Rep. at 137) and thus continued the line of

reasoning espoused, inter alia, by the Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of
the League of Nations in its Report on the status of the Aaland Islands. That body,
referred to by Judge McNair in his dissenting opinion ([1950] I.C.J. Rep. at 153-54),

took the view that the 1856 convention between France, Great Britain and Russia embodied "a settlement regulating European interests, . . . constituted a special international status for the Aalands Islands" and that "until these provisions are duly replaced by others, every State interested has the right to insist on compliance with them."
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL SPECIAL SupP. No. 3 17-19 (Oct. 1920).
Yet it is the considered view of this writer that the plea of necessity as transpoed
into, and transformed by, the law of international organization has equally influenced
the decision and served as one of its bases, as is shown by the language at the beginning of this note. It stands to reason, therefore, that, in respect of the law of international institutions the locus classicus on the plea of necessity may require re-appraisal,
since there it is said that "necessity may excuse the non-observation of international
obligations .. . "1 and that "the plea of necessity . . . by definition implies the impossi-

bility of proceeding by any other method than the one contrary to law." Oscar Chinn,
P.C.IJ., ser. A/B No. 63 at 114 (x934) (separate opinion of Anzilotti, J.).
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international practice has to offer in the absence of treaty stipulations
or their equivalent is an assumption of certain functions of a defunct
international body by a new organization on the basis that such assumption is necessary for the effective exercise of the other functions of the
new body. 170
The negative ruling of the Vice-President of the Court in the
matter of the application of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for the
appointment of an arbitrator in its dispute with Persia 1' may be
"questionable"' 172 inasmuch as some might have felt that the acceptance
by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933 of the appointment function at the instance of the British and Iranian Governments
was binding on the Court. In support of this view it could be argued
that the enumeration of functions transferred to the Court in articles
36(5) and thirty-seven of its statute was not limitative.13s Yet, the
argument developed by the Court in the first South-West African case
could be used to defend the actual ruling. "[W]hen the organ which
was formerly competent has been abolished, its powers cannot be regarded as automatically transferred to the new organ which replaces
it.'MT Under this reasoning, the new organ would seem to assume only
such specific functions of the defunct5 body as are indispensable for the
effective exercise of its other tasks.'
'" 0To this extent, the concept of Fankidonsnachfolge-a device used in German
postwar judicial practice to meet specific problems arising from the need for the federal
government to assume certain functions formerly carried out by the constituent units
(Linder) and the need for the Linder to assume other functions formerly carried out
by the Reich-finds expression in the law of international organizations also. See Reinhardt, 5 NauE JURIsTIsCHE WOCsENSCHRarr 441 (1952) D.ubler, 7 NEuE JuiisTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 5 (1954)5 STEINBOMER, DIE FuNKTIONSNACHFOLGE Pasim
(1957). On the use of this notion in international public law see 2 DAHM, VOLKERRECT 12o-21 ( g6x) and, for a monographic assessment, the trailblazing assessment
by Scheuner, supra note io,at 9,14-19, 46-48.
.[1952-53]
CI.J.Y.B. 45.
1!I1

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16g, n.4 (8th ed. 1955).

1T Ibid.

...
Judge Levi Carneiro in his separate opinion at [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 54.
""The Belgrade Danube Convention of August i8,1948, 33 U.N.T.S. xx, purports to dissolve the European Commission of the Danube and provides for the transfer
of its property to a body established under article zo of that convention. The Supplementary Protocol to the 1948 Convention, id. at 223, cancels certain financial obligations of the Commission. The functions, powers and status of that Commission were
governed by numerous diplomatic instruments which are enumerated in Editor's Notes
at 8 HUDSON 9z, 95. The Western Powers maintain that the Danube Convention of
1921 (I HUDSON 681) is still in force. The latter view is also taken in UN SI CLE DE
COOPE'RATION INTERNATIONALE SUR LE DANUBE x856-%956 Passim (x956) (collection of essays and reports on the Commission's achievements published by the Commis-
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III.
CONSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION

A. The significant feature of the instances which fall under this heading
is the avoidance of the problems habitually arising in cases of succession by the preservation of the legal identity of the organization concerned. The legal identity of the body in question remains the same,
because while the functions and powers of the international institution
has been modified, sometimes radically, its legal personality has been
left untouched. The underlying reasons for such structural stability
of international organizations are manifold and range from the recognized competence of an international secretariat which one wants to use
for purposes other than those hitherto served by it, to the political
desirability of maintaining a treaty in a modified form in lieu of replacing it by another and entirely new one. The gravity of the substantive changes is therefore not at all decisive in the choice of one or
the other means for ensuring continuity. In fact, minor adaptations in
purpose, functions and institutional structure may lead, in a given context, to the abolition of one organization and the establishment of
another which assumes some or all of the predecessor's functions, thus
bringing about a succession, whereas incisive reforms of an organization
need not involve the use of that device because the existing texts are
adapted to the exigencies of a specific political or factual setting by
means of changes in the basic law.
sion at the occasion of its centenary).

The present writer maintains his opinion that

the European Commission of the Danube is "functionally, if not legally extinct." Hahn,
International and Supranational Public Authorities, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 638,
642 (i961).
See also Dr. W., Die rechtlichen Grundlagen des Donauverkehrs, 12 DER
VERKEHR x6o, 1639 (1956).
An account of the opposing views is given in No. 37
der Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates IX GP (Austria)
of September 9, 1959, at 21-22. When Austria acceded to the 1948 Convention, the
transfer of property provided for in the Supplementary Protocol had already been
carried out. Nevertheless, the European Commission of the Danube and the International Commission of the Danube, as established in Rome by the Western Powers,
continue the "liquidation" begun after the 1948 Belgrade Conference, notably in respect
of pension claims. See, e.g., the public convocation on behalf of the European Commission of the Danube, Gaxzetta Ufficiale del la Repubblica Italiana No. 43 of February
22, 1954, P.557, items 871 & 872. For the purposes of the present study the whole case
may be considered as an instance of discontinuity ratione personae and ratione materiae.
However, it should be noted that, as Seidl-Hohenveldern, 7 ARCHIV DES V6LKERRECH'M
258 (1958), has pointed out, there is a certain functional resemblance between the
Danube Commission established under the 1948 Convention and the International Commission of the Danube as provided for in the 1921 Convention.
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ILO

After the Second World War, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) was reformed by a revision of its constitution, though it cannot
be said that the resulting changes in its functions and powers were more
important than in cases where the same effect was achieved by way of
succession.
The revision of the ILO Constitution was brought about in three
main stages,17" the first of which was the adoption, by the International

Labor Conference (ILC), of the Declaration of Philadelphia in May,
1944, which was designed to redefine the aims and purposes of the
ILO."' The second stage in the process of revision was the adoption
of the Constitution of the ILO Instrument of Amendment of 1945,178
which would adapt the ILO Constitution to the exigencies resulting
from the impending liquidation of the League of Nations, notably the
separation of ILO membership from that of the United Nations and
financial autonomy vis- -vis the United Nations. The second stage of
the revision also was to provide a procedure for the entry into force of
further amendments to the ILO Constitution. The 1946 Instrument
of Amendment"' set forth a number of far-reaching changes consequential upon the dissolution of the League of Nations which were
complementary to the preceding amendments and constituted the third
stage of the revision. Simultaneously with these constitutional amendments the relations between the ILO and other international bodies
were revised by a series of agreements with the United Nations, the
specialized agencies of the United Nations, and other international
organizations 8
(2) WEU
The second case in point is the revision and extension of the Treaty
of Brussels of March I7, 1948, 81 and the transformation of the insti.. Outlined in a brochure of the International Labor Office prepared for the 27th
session of the ILC, Paris, 1945, entitled Report IV(x) "Matters arising out of the Work
of the Constitutional Committee, Part x, The Relationship of the ILO to other InterBodies," (Montreal, 1945).
national
7
""
Id. Appendix 11 at 46.
18 9 HUDSON 743.

179Id. at 749.

present recital follows the account of the ILO reform by Jenks, 23 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 303 (.946).
1'"The
1n 1

EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 207 (1955).

For comment see Kunz, Pan Europe, The
Marshall Plan Countries and the Western European Union, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 868

(1948).
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tutional arrangement provided for in that treaty into the Western
European Union (WEU), following the rejection of the European
Defense Community Treaty by the French Parliament in April, 1954.282
The 1948 Brussels Treaty had been, inter alia, an agreement for the
"collective self-defence" of France, the United Kingdom, and the
Benelux countries, notably for the purpose of taking such steps as might
be deemed necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of its
policy of aggression.l
By 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany
was regarded as a desirable ally rather than as a potential aggressor and
Italy had become an ally through its participation in NATO. These
changes were acknowledged by the amendments provided for in Protocol I to the Brussels Treaty modifying and completing that agreement."8 4 The reference to the potential danger arising from a renewal
of the German policy of aggression was replaced by the object of "promoting the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe.' 8 5 In addition to the accession of Germany and Italy to the
revised Brussels Treaty, the protocol provided for some institutional
amendments, in particular for the creation of the Council of WEU.
The picture would be incomplete were it not mentioned that the revision
of the Brussels Treaty was one facet of the operation which put an end
to the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and
opened to that state the way to membership in NATO. 8"
B. A different type of adaptation by an international organization to
the changing demands of politics and policy is represented by the transformation of the Union of American Republics into the Organization
"' See Robertson, The Creation of tMe Western European Union, 2 EUROPEAN
YEARBooK 125 (x956).
" 6th recital of Preamble.
142 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 313-16 (1956).

...d. at 335.
""See 7. DAHM, V6LKERRECHT 274-76 (396)

; Bebr, The European Defense Cont-

munity and Westrn European Union: .4n Agonizing Dilemma, 7 STAN. L. REv. x69
(1955). The continuity between the 1948 treaty and the WEU Constitution becomes
apparent in the opinion of'the WEU secretariat that the period of validity of 5o years,
specified in article 3o of the earlier instrument, I EUROPEAN YB. 207, 233 (3955),
and now set forth in article 12 of the text as amended by Protocol No. i of October 23,
1954, to the z948 treaty, 2 EUROPEAN YB. 313-36 (x956),

still runs from March 17,

3948, the date of signature of the original treaty. However, according to the same
source the WEU members which had not appertained to the Brussels Treaty Organization
were not necessarily bound by the acts adopted by organs of the latter body, though
the new members did in fact abide by the measures in question. Moreover, certain
agreements concluded in the form of conventional arrangements among the five members
of the Brussels Treaty Organization did not automatically apply to Germany and Italy,
but only after these states had notified their adherence to the instruments.
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of American States (OAS) in 1948.18 7 The concept and the reality of

an inter-American organization had grown since 1826, when delegates
from Central and South American states assembled at Panama City to
sign a Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation. 8 The
idea persisted throughout the nineteenth century, but none of the Latin
American congresses took any organizational measures until the Washington Conference in 189o set up the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, which was the predecessor of the Pan-American Union.'8 9

Resolutions of inter-American conferences provided for the inception of
the structural framework of the states until, in i9io, the names of the
secretarial services and of the association of these states were changed
to Pan-American Union and Union of American Republics. A convention signed in Havana in 1928190 created a Union of American States
with (I) International Conferences of American States, (2) the PanAmerican Union (Secretariat) and (3) other organs to be established by
convention between the American states.
That treaty having failed to enter into force because it did not attain
the necessary number of ratifications,' the Mexico City Conference of
1945 proposed to strengthen, reorganize, and consolidate the interAmerican system as it had developed thus far, but left it to a following
meeting of American governments to give a permanent form to the
organizational structure. This consolidation was brought about by the
Bogata Charter of April 30, 1948.92 The organs set forth in the 1948
treaty have not only retained the functions assigned to those which
existed until then, but, moreover, their names resemble or are identical
.. See Pan American Union v. American Security & Trust Co., [195i] Int'l L.
Rep. 441 (D.D.C. 1952). For the reasons suggested in the text it is believed that this
transition did not involve a succession, as the court thought, but that the decision could
have been based more appropriately, in the present writer's view, on the concept of identity. It seems that the leading article on the Bogota Charter, Kunz, The Bogota
Charter of the Organization of American Statesi 4z AM. J. INT'L L. 568 (1948), also
considers the instance as a reform or reorganization rather than as a succession. For
related reasons it is believed that the European Commission of the Danube as it operated
under the Convention instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube, signed July 23,
1921, I HUDSON 681, was identical with the institution of the same name which administered large parts of the Danube before 1914 under a series of international acts
conveniently listed in the Editor's Note, ibd.
2 PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 540 (t956).

x Ibid.
...Convention on the Pan American Union, Feb.
2 PEASLEF,
201

1

20, x928, 4 HUDSON 2420.

op. cit. supra note x88, at 541.

"ld. at S45, in force since December 13,
of ratification.

5951,

on deposit of fourteen instruments
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to the designations which had been coined for them in the long evolutionary process between 1826 and 1948. Thus, the Inter-American Conference, the "supreme organ" of the OAS is composed of representatives
of all member states and continues the series of international conferences commenced in 189o. The "organ of consultation," assembling
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, carries on the work of the comparable
body created by decisions taken at the 1938 Inter-American Conference
at Buenos Aires.198 The Pan-American Union retained not only its
title but also its tasks as the cultural and permanent organ of the OAS.
There are innovations: the Council, which is an assembly of governmental representatives with subsidiary bodies for economic, legal and
cultural matters; a Security Council; and specialized conferences which
were, however, for the most part already existing inter-governmental
and private bodies pursuing specific objectives within the wider context
of the OAS. Finally, the 1948 reform brought the OAS into relationship with the United Nations and made it a regional system in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.1"'
In spite of these unprecedented features, OAS has preserved "its
identity and relative independence" as the association of the American
states.195 Notwithstanding the fact that the 1948 reform involved a
reorganization and produced some institutional and functional innovations, the root of the matter may be described as the replacement of
one constitution, which consisted of a series of law-making acts of intergovernmental institutions adopted by various organs of the interAmerican regional community, by a treaty. In short, this was a stabilization of existing constitutional structures by the consolidation of their
basic instruments in one international agreement. A change in substance
occurred only insofar as some new organs, powers, and functions were
added to the existing ones196 by means of changes in the basic law.
C. Another instance of constitutional adaptation was provided for in
the convention relating to certain institutions common to the European Communities signed, together with the Common Market and
EURATOM Treaties, on March 25, 1957, at Rome 7 The signa198

Id. at 542.

...U.N.

33, 37, 51-54; OAS CHARTER arts. 1, 4, 6x, xo2, 11o.
supra note 187, at 587-88.
198 See Fenwick, The Ninth; International Conference of American States, 42 Am.
CHARTER arts.

.9Kunz,

J. INT'L L. 553, 555-56 (1948).

197 298 U.N.T.S.

171

(z958).

The English text is a brochure published by the

Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and EURATOM, at 351
(Brussels 1957), and in x PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERMI ENTAL ORWANIZATIONS
614 (2d ed. 196i).
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tories of this convention were identical with those of the two former
treaties and were representing the same governments whose representatives had signed the treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community in April, 1952.19
The protocol provided for the replacement of the Court of Justice
and the Common Assembly established by the ECSC Treaty by one
judicial and one parliamentary institution to serve all three communities, and amended the ECSC Treaty accordingly. On purely verbal
considerations, the words "replace"199 in articles two and four of the
convention might admit doubts as to whether the new organs are meant
to be the successors to or identical with already existing institutions.
But that would be contrary to the legislative intent underlying the modification of the ECSC Treaty. The real legal nature of the change is that
the court established by the Treaty of April 18, 1952, remains one
and the same; it simply receives new functions while continuing to carry
on its old ones. The same holds true for the Assembly of the ECSC.
Only if the bodies created in 1952 had been abolished in lieu of being
reconstituted with supplementary functions would it have been appropriate to qualify the change as succession. 0
D. There are the instances where international institutions have been
kept alive in spite of changes in their law which were as grave as those
which in other cases were conducive to the dissolution of one body and

the creation of another one to succeed it. If any general observation
EUROPEAN Y'B. 359 (1955).
2.1 The French and German versions employ respectively "remplace" and "tritt an
298 1

die Stelle2 BUNDESGESETBLATr Tell II xi58-6a (957).
' See to this effect Maurice Lagrange, Advocate General of the Court since

1952:

"[IT]here exists no discontinuity between the Court of Justice of the E.C.S.C. and the
single Court of Justice that has been substituted effective October 7, 1958. . . . proceedings that had already been instituted under the old Court have been processed
without interruption under transitional rules. Continuity has been the more easily
ensured as four of the seven judges, as well as the two advocates general and the registrar, have been transferred from the old Court to the new." Lagrange, The Role of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities as Seen Through Its Case LaW, 26 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 400, 4ox (1961). This view is confirmed by the following passages in Bundestags Drucksache 3440 of May 4, 1957, Anlage C, which contained the
German Federal Government's comments on the EURATOM and Common Market
Treaties as submitted to the German Federal Parliament in 1957; "Die Erweiterung
der Zustndigkeit der Versammlung auf die Europlische Gemeinschaft frir Kohle und
Stahl machte eine Anpassung des Art. 21 des Vertrages fiber die Grfindung der Europlischen Gemeinschaft ffir Kohle und Stahl hotwendig. . . . Die Erweiterung der
Zustandigkeit des Gemeinsamen Gerichtshofes auch ffir die Europaische Gemeinschaft
ffr Kohle und Stahl bedingt eine Anpassung des Art. 32 des Montanvertrage. .. .
Id. at 198-99.
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may be fitting here, it is that in the law of international organizations, as
in other domains of the law, as a rule, legal principles govern only the
application of statutory or conventional rules, and they are rarely, if
ever, responsible for the enactment and repeal of such rules.
IV.
ADMINISTRATWE ADAPTATION

The same general observation above made is also true with regard
to the adaptation of international organizations to new exigencies without recourse to dissolution or constitutional changes. The case foremost
in point is the transformation of the Universal Postal Union (UPU)
into a specialized agency of the United Nations. The legal mechanism
employed to bring about that change was quite different from constitutional adaptation.
It is not contended that in fact the UPU's activity has been modified
on its becoming a specialized agency of the United Nations within the
meaning of Article fifty-seven of the United Nations Charter, nor that
the Relationship Agreement of July 4, 1947, as amended by the Supplementary Agreement of July, 1949,201 was particularly suited to bring
about such a change. 0 2 Yet the juridical potentialities which that
agreement and Article sixty-three of the United Nations Charter imply2 03 are such that one might consider them susceptible of influencing
the general direction of the UPU and its organs. Though brought
about by much less than the adaptation of constituent texts, the relationship agreement with the United Nations in a way ensured the continuity of the functions hitherto exercised by the UPU on the taking
effect of the United Nations Charter by placing it within the framework
of this world-wide political community.
Adaptation by such a treaty is not the only method of extraconstitutional change, however. There is another approach which enSol 2 PEASLEF, op. cit. supra note 188, at 785.
sos See CARROZ ET PROBST, PERSONNALITE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONALE Er CAPACT
DE CONcLURE DES T.Airs DE L'O.N.U. ET DES INSTIT TIoNs SPECIALISEES 27 (1953)1
KASME, LA CAPACITJ DE L'ORGANIZATION DES NATIONS UNIES DE CONCLURE DES TRAtTEs xo8 (ig6o)i LABEyRIE-MENAHEM, DES INSTITUTIONS SPECIALISAES 34 (9S3)'
21 For a survey of United Nations practice under that provision, see 3 REPEITORY
OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 1 xxo-284 of comments on Art. 63; id.,
Supp. No. x., Vol. 2, If x-18 of comments on Art. 63. For the texts of the relationship
agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies and the International
Atomic Energy Agency see U.N. doc. ST/SG/s 4 (g6i).
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sures the continuity of internationalized functions under changing conditions by the foundation of new institutions, affiliates, or subsidiaries,'
which may or may not have organs in common with the parent institution, yet, in any event, retain some link with it, thereby proving their
inter-dependence. 205 The reason for this technique is usually that while
constitutional revision, a simple law-making act of, or a treaty concluded
by, the parent body might enlarge its functions to take care of new, increased responsibilities, overriding political, financial, or other" 6 reasons
suggest the limitation of its substantive and procedural liabilities and the
financial engagements likely to result therefrom.
V.
AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT

The purpose of this article has not been to prove the existence of a
closely-knit system whereby continuity is ensured in the law of international organizations, but rather to look at instances in which successful
attempts at achieving continuity have been made and at others where
that objective has not been reached because the means used were insufficient. This explains the restriction of this array to instances where a
transition actually occurred and the leaving aside of provisions in constitutional treaties which permit transitions but which have never been
applied in practice.
The devotion to actual cases has the doctrinal advantage of showing
the principles governing the application and interpretation of legal rules
on the continuity of internationalized functions. Of these principles
there is one which is basic, namely that of effectiveness. It means in
the law of international organizations generally that international institutions are created to work and to carry out the functions entrusted to
"

E.g., Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation (x955)

in

I PEASLEE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1174. (2d ed. t961);
Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association (196o), id. at 1139.
Both of these institutions have been founded by the IBRD to meet novel requirements in
the field of international financing.
For details see Art. VI of the IDA Articles of Agreement and Art. IV of the
IFC Articles of Agreement which, while specifying that the two bodies are separate
entities and distinct from the IBRD, nevertheless provides that the same persons are
Governors and Executive Directors-Directors--of the two new institutions and the

IBRD.
'"Thus certain operational tasks have been entrusted by EuRAToM and Common
Market Treaties to entities with a legal personality of their own distinct from those of
the Communities. See EURATOM TREATY, Arts. 4.5-51 (joint enterprises) 298 U.N.T.S.
171 (1 9 5 8); Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank, 198 U.N.T.S.
120 (19S3).
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them; and that when a higher norm does not provide anything to the
contrary, then an international act has to be applied in such a way as to
ensure a meaningful activity of the international body concerned. This
is also the pattern of legal thought which should be observed whenever
the continuous display of internationalized functions is at stake.
On the basis of that insight, the question why in one case the principle of effectiveness may require the rapid death and in the other the
prolongation of the life of an international body, why in one case succession must be denied and in the other, even in absence of express
conventional or equivalent texts to that effect, affirmed, can be answered.
The purpose of continuity in the law of international organizations is
not the continuity of those organizations, but the continuous display of
specific activities by a multi-national body, once its member states have
decided that the internationalization of a functional task is desirable and
as long as these states maintain their decision, it being understood that
continuity may be achieved by succession among international institutions
as well as by the maintenance of a given corporate entity.
It is important, however, whether the end is attained through succession between international bodies or through the preservation of
their legal identity, if for no other reason than, as a rule, the staff20 7 and
financial status of the organization, its assets, and liabilities remain
unaffected when the latter solution is chosen. But the overriding purpose of continuity in the law of international organizations may be
achieved by either method, that purpose being in each concrete case the
maintenance of a functional service for a community of states, established
precisely with that objective in view. To the extent that such continuity
ensures compliance with rules of law, in the measure that it withdraws
a functional substantive domain from the reign of rough-hewn precepts
of the law of nations by retaining that area within the scope of the law
of international institutions and thus contributes to the introduction of
predictability and order in international relations, continuity is in itself
an element of legal justice.
201 While one might be inclined to assume that the personnel of an institution undergoing constitutional reform remains unaffected thereby, that view would not alwayn
be-it is submitted-an appropriate statement of fact and of law.

